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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars discuss a “constitutionalization” of international law.1 Some
look for a document or set of documents that can be the “constitution” in this
constitutionalizing or constitutionalized system.2 Common candidates include
the Charter of the United Nations (Charter),3 all or parts of the “International
Bill of Rights” (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Cultural, Social, and Economic Rights (ICESCR)),4
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).5 Comparisons
between international law and domestic constitutional orders help determine
whether this process of constitutionalization is taking place or complete.6 Some
domestic courts use international law to decide cases and understand legal
phenomena.7 Some conduct constitutional comparisons to decide cases.8 These
phenomena combine to raise an intriguing question: To what extent can the kinds
of comparisons between the international legal order and domestic constitutional
legal orders that have provided information about international law and the
constitutionalization thereof now shed light on domestic constitutional laws?
This Article provides a response. It proposes caution in conducting such
comparisons to address constitutional issues and argues that at least most valid
comparisons to fulfill constitutional law purposes likely do not qualify as forms
of comparative constitutional law but are instead examples of other kinds of
(often clearly useful) analysis. “Constitutional” comparisons to decide
constitutional cases in one’s state are legitimate where the foreign legal order is
sufficiently similar to one’s domestic constitutional legal order such that we can

1
See, e.g., RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD];
JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2009).
2
Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 61, 62 (1989);
See also, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations
Revisited, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 19 (1997); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as
Constitution of The International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 529, 558, 567, 593, 618
(1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 749, 759
(2008).
3
U.N. Charter art. 102. On its candidacy see Sloan, supra note 2, at 61; Dupuy, supra note 2, at 12;
CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE IX (Kluwer Law
Int’l 1995) [hereinafter Tomuschat].
4
G.A. Res. 217 (III) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR];
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. On the status and joint candidacy of this “International Bill of Rights,” see
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 750.
5
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
On its candidacy (and that of other documents), See KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at
23–25.
6
RULING THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 18. See also, Sloan, supra note 2, at 63.
7
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 2 S.C.R. 817, 47 (Can.) (see
para. 70 for other transnational case law). Some courts are bound to use it. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST.,
1996, § 39(1)(b).
8
See, e.g., THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 5–10 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Choudhry].
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plausibly understand the foreign legal order as constitutional and capable of
providing insight into the nature of constitutions, constitutionalism, and
constitutional phenomena. Yet, there is reason to question whether the
international legal order has enough features of domestic constitutional orders
to justify this form of judicial comparison between the international legal order
and domestic constitutional orders. The ongoing constitutionalization process is
unlikely to produce an international legal order with sufficiently similar features
to domestic constitutional orders. To make this clear, I address the case of a
Charter-based international “constitutional” order. I explore whether the Charter
is an international constitution and whether the system that it anchors is a
constitutional legal order, providing negative responses to both inquiries. I
further detail other reasons to question whether any international legal system is
relevantly similar to domestic constitutional systems. While these reasons are,
perhaps, inconclusive on whether and the extent to which international law can
inform comparative constitutional law as a general matter, they at least suggest
that one should take care before comparing the regimes (or their parts) and that
such exercises may not qualify as comparative constitutional law in any case.
Methodologically, these reasons likely also put the onus on those who seek to
compare to explain why their proposed comparison is apt. Meeting that onus
may also require addressing different considerations than meeting the onus for
establishing the aptness of classical comparative constitutional analysis. These
findings are individually and jointly important for our understanding of the
contours of comparative constitutional law as a discipline and decisions about
whether and when to invoke international law when conducting comparative
scholarship or deciding legal cases using comparative or foreign materials.
The first three parts of my argument are descriptive. Part I outlines relevant
phenomena. Part II limits my focus. Part III identifies recognized necessary
features of domestic constitutions and constitutional legal orders. The next three
parts are substantive. Part IV outlines the strongest arguments for the Charter as
the center of an international constitutional order. Part V demonstrates that the
argument in Part IV is not as strong as it appears and provides an original case
against comparison (at least as a regular practice). It demonstrates that the
Charter lacks core features of domestic constitutions, the Charter-centered legal
order lacks features of domestic constitutional legal orders, and future
international constitutional orders will likely importantly differ from domestic
constitutional orders. It then raises conceptual problems for comparison: the
practices of international and domestic law query whether international law is
independent of domestic practice in a way that will allow international law to
serve as a comparator and many apparent comparative uses of international law
are simple domestic legal applications. It then explains how arguments for a
Charter-based constitutional system are undermined by the Charter’s lack of
common domestic constitutional legal entitlements and by history. These
arguments against recognition are only presented in brief due to space
constraints and clearly do not suffice to bar comparation between international
and domestic orders, but they jointly suggest that comparison between these
orders does not qualify as comparative constitutional law and likely suffice to
limit the circumstances in which international law can be used to fulfill
comparative constitutional law’s purposes. Indeed, the instances in which
international law is appropriate for judicial resolution of cases are rarely
instances in which it is viewed constitutionally. This (possibly inconclusive)
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skepticism about the domains in which international law should be used in
constitutional matters at least problematizes claims that comparison is usually
apt. I address objections in Part VI.
I. RELEVANT PHENOMENA
Three phenomena are relevant to this discussion: the constitutionalization
of international law, interaction between international and domestic laws, and
the search for comparative law methodological best practices. To begin, many
scholars agree that international law is undergoing a process of
constitutionalization, but that process is ongoing and incomplete.9 Debate on the
nature of this constitutionalization continues. Constitutionalization as a process
of securing certain foundational norms distinctive of all legal communities is
distinct from constitutionalization as a process of identifying a hierarchical law
that binds all communities.10 Domestic “constitutions” serve the latter role and
are partially justified by their ability to secure the former.11 Yet, while some
institutions must ensure that constitutional principles are at the top of a
normative hierarchy for constitutionalization in any sense to be realized,12 it is
unclear whether the kind of hierarchically superior legal regime or document
that courts invoke when doing comparative constitutional law will best ensure
that international law is foundationally grounded in and helps further norms
distinctive of all legal communities.13 These difficulties are partially responsible
for a break in the literature on the constitutionalization of international law.
Some scholars seek to identify the document or documents that will be
hierarchically superior to all other international law and serve the role of
constitutions in domestic constitutional orders.14 Other scholars seek to ensure
that certain norms are fulfilled even absent a hierarchical document, documents,
or even (constitutional) case law, with some further questioning whether
domestic constitutional forms are most likely to ensure that these norms are
foundational and furthered in international law.15
Regardless of whether international law’s “constitutionalization” is ongoing
or complete and of the form it is taking or should take, international law plays a
role in domestic law and vice versa. Domestic courts appeal to international law
to solve cases. Some are legally bound to do so.16 In “monist” states,
international law directly applies as domestic law when a treaty goes into force,17

9

KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 4; Fassbender, supra note 2, at 532, 576.
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 752–753.
11
Id. at 752–753.
12
Dupuy, supra note 2, at 3.
13
KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23.
14
See generally Sloan, supra note 2; Dupuy, supra note 2; Fassbender, supra note 2; Gardbaum,
supra note 2.
15
E.g., KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1.
16
E.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1)(b).
17
E.g., Joseph G.J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 66 (1936); NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
10
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so courts must use international law to resolve some cases. Use of international
law in “dualist” states where an international law has not undergone
implementation procedures to become part of domestic law is contentious, but
dualist state courts too sometimes appeal to international law to understand
concepts and otherwise interpret domestic laws.18 Domestic laws, including
comparative analyses, also help establish international law’s content.19 Absent
frequent judicial review by international courts, domestic courts implement and
interpret international laws.20 These actions translate international law into
domestic proscriptions.21 They are also evidence of international law’s content
since state practice articulates parts of that content.22
Finally, comparative constitutional law is now a standard, if controversial,
judicial decision-making tool and independent branch of legal academia. Actors
in Germany, Canada, and many other liberal democracies commonly cite one
another.23 Courts in Israel, South Africa, and elsewhere hire foreign lawyers as
clerks to ensure some broad conformity in a transnational constitutional
jurisprudence.24 Comparative law generally and comparative constitutional law
particularly now have standalone status within the academy and are studied
absent triggering events like the end of the Cold War.25 Second order questions
of how to do legal comparison are instead central.26 Whether comparative law
requires a single methodology, which methodology that could be, and which
methodology qualifies as best practices (and for which ends) are vexing
questions.27 Comparativists also debate how to select subjects of comparison.28
Yet, it should be clear that one must compare things with fundamental
constitutional features in order to conduct comparisons that will shed light on

3–10 (Janne E. Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2009); But see Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila
Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical Investigation, 109 AM. J. INT’L L.
514, 516–517, 522–527 (2015).
18
This is so even where international law is not formally part of the dualist state’s domestic law. See
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 2 S.C.R. 817, 47 (Can.); see also 2 S.
AFR. CONST., § 39(1)(b).
19
Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
501 (2000); Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating
and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 57 (2011).
20
Id.
21
Knop, supra note 19.
22
Roberts, supra note 19, at 62.
23
See, e.g., Choudhry, supra note 8, at 5–10.
24
See, e.g., YALE LAW SCHOOL CAREER DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, OPPORTUNITIES WITH
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND FOREIGN COURTS (2016) (listing the jobs). See also, e.g., AHARON
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism,
83 VA. L. Rev. 771 (1997); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutionalism in the Age of Rights—A
Prolegomenon, 121 S. AFR. L.J. 278, 285 (2004) (each discussing and evaluating the relevant
transnational actions).
25
MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 114 (2d
ed. 2014).
26
Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (on
constitutional law); RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2014) (also on constitutional law); THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds.,
2015) (discussing broader comparisons).
27
See generally Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985); Mathias M. Siems, The End of Comparative Law, 2 J. COMP. L. 133 (2007).
28
See HIRSCHL, supra note 26, at 244–267 (examining options).
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constitutions and constitutional phenomena. Comparing something with such
features with something without them will rarely provide insight into either.
Where several features are lacking, it is questionable whether there even is a
constitution with which one can compare core cases. If there is no constitution
or constitutional order, there will be no subject for most different comparative
constitutional law analyses. When we say something is the “most different”
constitutional order, we still believe it has sufficient features of constitutional
orders and thus is part of the same species as other constitutional orders.29
Literatures on these phenomena are often divorced. Intersections usually
focus on implications of their overlap for international law. Many scholars use
comparative law to analyze international law. Most begin with set features of
constitutions and compare them with international law. The comparative
constitutional analysis predates the comparison with international law. No
statements about the content of domestic constitutional laws are meant to follow.
Even discussion of the potential of the Charter’s ability to serve as an
international constitution often focuses on the implications of this view for
international law only.30 A main argument for the Charter’s constitutional status
does not include a single comparative or constitutional law insight in its list of
consequences of recognition.31 International courts also use comparative law to
analyze international law.32 Addressing these questions independently is
justifiable: “[c]omparative constitutional law concerns national court decisions
on constitutional law, which may overlap, but are not coextensive, with domestic
judgments on international norms.”33 Yet comparative international law, the
study of how jurisdictions implement international law,34 demonstrates that one
can gain valuable insights into the law by addressing them in tandem. Most
extant insight is into the nature of international law, not constitutional law.
This work examines the extent to which addressing these phenomena can
help us better understand constitutional law. We can learn about international
law by comparing the international and the domestic “constitutional orders.”
Can we learn about constitutional law from the same kind of analysis or can we
only apply international law in domestic situations? Is such an analysis part of
international law, domestic constitutional law, or comparative (constitutional)

29
See KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1. See also David Kennedy, New Approaches to
Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997)
(arguing that comparatists should understand how their work contributes to and can help further a global
governance project with international governance elements (though Kennedy is largely an exception to
the trend here)).
30
Fassbender, supra note 2, at 538–551.
31
Id. See also Sloan, supra note 2 (leveraging in-depth comparison to gain insights into international
law but making no claims about constitutional law or the use of comparison to gain insights into
constitutions or constitutional phenomena).
32
E.g., Neha Jain, Comparative International Law at the ICTY: The General Principles Experiment,
109 AM. J. INT’L L. 486, 490 (2015) (suggesting they do so unsystematically).
33
Roberts, supra note 19, at 81.
34
E.g., ANTHEA ROBERTS et al., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018) [hereinafter
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW]; See also Anthea Roberts et al., Comparative International Law:
Framing the Field, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467, 474 (2015) (a special issue on “Exploring Comparative
International Law”). Neither treats international law as a subject of comparative constitutional analysis.
There is a sense which the current project fits under the “analysis” branch of the most influential definition
of comparative international law and can be understood as a normative branch of that largely descriptive
field. But this work is not an example of the paradigmatic comparative international law projects that can
contribute to international law. Id. at 469–471.
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law? We know that courts use international law in their decisions. Can they use
international law as a source for comparative constitutional analysis that will
shed light on constitutions and constitutional phenomena? Work in comparative
law methodology suggests that this will only be licit where there is an
international constitutional order like a domestic one. But can we view
international law as having a constitution or constitutional order like a domestic
one? Can we then use its case law as a way of understanding domestic legal
issues? Answering all these questions completely likely requires a full-length
book, but some initial suggestive considerations, detailed below, at least
establish the need to take caution before invoking international law in
comparative constitutional exercises. I provide partial answers thereto in the
service of two master questions: Does the international legal order share
sufficient features of domestic constitutional orders to justify judicial
comparison between the international legal order and domestic constitutional
orders to resolve cases? If so, when? I argue that international law’s
constitutionalization is producing something insufficiently like modern
domestic constitutions to gain adequate insight into domestic constitutions and
constitutional phenomena to warrant comparison in many cases. Deciding
domestic constitutional cases based on comparisons with international law is
accordingly dubious in most cases given the stakes of legal decisions.35 Judges
should accordingly be cautious about using international law for comparative
purposes. This does not mean that international law has no role to play in the
resolution of legal cases. International law may even have a role to play in
understanding some constitutional phenomena. But the concerns I raise about
international law’s purported constitutionality do suggest that international
law’s role in comparative constitutional law should be more circumscribed than
is often assumed. Many licit uses of international law in deciding cases are
actually non-comparative and many comparisons between international and
domestic laws are not best described as comparisons between truly constitutional
phenomena.

II. SCOPE
The case for international law as a source for comparative constitutional
analysis generally is, again and of course, too broad a topic for one work. I thus
limit the scope of my analysis. While constitutionalization can take several
forms, I focus on constitutionalization as a process of identifying a hierarchical
law that binds all communities.36 Above, I contrasted this sense of
constitutionalization with a sense of constitutionalization as a process of
securing foundational norms distinctive of all legal communities.37 Call these
“legal ordering” and “norm-diffusing” senses of constitutionalization. The legal

35
Where we gain insight into some constitutional phenomena from such comparison, there is reason
to question whether the comparison is legal, rather than academic or moral, in nature and whether
international law has special insight or authority in academic or moral works.
36
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 752–753.
37
Id.
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ordering sense looks for a common structure between entities. The normdiffusing sense looks for a stable set of norms across jurisdictions. These senses
may not always coexist. My interest here is in the legal ordering sense alone.
This focus may elide important differences between other types of
constitutionalization,38 but I address parts of some of those distinctions and
others are orthogonal to this particular project. Two representative sets of
distinctions make this clear. First, I integrate Pierre-Marie Dupuy’s distinction
between two kinds of constitutions: on his “material” or “substantial” view, “a
constitution is to be considered as a set of legal principles of paramount
importance for every one of the subjects belonging to the social community ruled
by it” and the principles are placed above all other components of the legal
system in a hierarchy of norms, while on his “organic” or “institutional” view,
a constitution “points to the designation of public organs, the separation of
powers and the different institutions which are endowed each with its own
competencies.”39 My criteria for legal ordering constitutionalization below
incorporates parts of both kinds.
Second, distinctions crucial to ongoing debates about the sources of
constitutionalization in the norm-diffusing sense—contrasting traditional
approaches seeking national sources of existing norms,40 pluralistic approaches
in which norms are produced by multiple overlapping centers of public
authority,41 and new approaches in which norms are produced by a mix of
private and public sources42—are not directly relevant here. The sources, relative
value of, and best means of fulfilling norms are good research topics. For
instance, constitutional legal orders may protect the wrong norms, including
those we would not want a norm-diffusing sense of constitutionalization to
emphasize. Yet even determining whether this is generally true requires different
work on the nature of legal ordering constitutions first.43 Study of the shared
norms of international and domestic constitutional orders is then common.
Where harmonization is a core comparative law concern and shared norms aid
harmonization, such projects may be central to comparative law.44 I nonetheless
focus elsewhere, partly to avoid overlap with existing research and partly
because I am interested in comparison for legal purposes and abstractly
comparing norms is not a legal task. One needs to compare similar things to gain
insight in comparative analysis. Similarity in law requires that norms exist in
similar legal structures. Constitutional documents and orders in domestic

38
My approach responds to related concerns raised by Garrett Wallace Brown. See Garrett Wallace
Brown, The Constitutionalization of What?, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 201 (2012).
39
Dupuy, supra note 2, at 3.
40
E.g., constitutional contributions to the “legal transplants” literature. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (2d ed. 1993) (on transplants).
41
E.g., Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 321 (2002); Neil
Walker, Constitutional Pluralism Revisited, 22 EUR. L. J. 333, 354 (2016).
42
Compare GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND GLOBALIZATION (2012), with NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER (Stephen Gill & A.
Claire Cutler eds., 2014).
43
See The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, supra note 41, at 323. Future legal orders could be
tailored to meet different norm-diffusing goals. Calling such systems constitutional in the legal ordering
sense today would be premature. While the pluralist model was designed to describe the European Union
model of governance, we cannot assume the E.U. is like a domestic constitutional order.
44
But see Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699 (1991).
See also infra the discussion of the “Shared Project Argument.”
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spheres do not take pluralistic forms or give primary powers to private actors in
ways that would allow international legal orders that tried to instantiate some
values of the norm-diffusing sense of constitution to be proper comparators for
domestic ones.45
Whether domestic constitutions should be pluralistic is an excellent
question, but the second limitation on my current research task provides reason
not to address it: I choose to focus primarily on judicial comparison here. Many
stakeholders do comparative constitutional law.46 But the stakes of comparison
are highest in judicial settings. Judges who exercise improper comparisons risk
making binding bad law that improperly allocates legal rights and obligations.
Proper bases of comparison are thus most necessary in judicial decision-making.
The judiciary’s role as user of international and comparative law also makes this
focus an interesting case study in whether international law as comparative law
is licit.47 Judges must apply laws and explore legal phenomenon. The general
nature of norms is beyond their competence and authority. They instead explore
how norms exist in legal structures. They can only look at norms in other
structures when the structures are like those in their jurisdictions. They otherwise
risk importing norms that would not operate in the same way in their system
(and could go against the nature of the system he is supposed to protect). Normdiffusion is at most a small part of the judicial role and secondary to a
commitment to applying one’s own law that requires comparison only with legal
systems like one’s own. My narrower focus lets us identify the value of
comparison in its most important genuinely legal form, helping to see if and
when comparison with international orders can provide insight into central
constitutional issues (or whether it should be peripheral).
One may argue that my so-limited project is too academic to warrant
sustained analysis: judicial use of international law as a comparator is
uncommon. Yet this project’s academic nature puts it on a par with most
comparative constitutional law works. Judges rarely use any constitutional
comparison to decide cases.48 Foreign citations are infrequent even in
paradigmatic examples of nations that cite foreign law comparison between
countries to decide cases is rarer still.49 Moreover, there is reason to think that
my own academic project is also important for understanding law and legal
method. Questions of what it means to have a constitutional structure, when it is
legitimate to study the law of another nation to resolve high stakes issues, and

45

See infra Part V.
See generally Hirschl, supra note 26.
See COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 34.
48
See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010); See
also Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, Conclusion: The Use of Foreign Precedents by
Constitutional Judges: A Limited Practice, an Uncertain Future, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS
BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 411 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013). Comparison
between the domestic and international is more common in international decision-making than in
domestic decision-making. This raises the question of whether the converse would be justified.
49
Commentary often focuses on the American case. See, e.g., Peter McCormick, American Citations
and the McLachlin Court: An Empirical Study, 47 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 83 (2009). This is appropriate.
Canadian courts cite American courts more than alternatives and the issue is generalized. See, e.g.
Gianluca Gentili, Canada: Protecting Rights in a “Worldwide Rights Culture”: An Empirical Study of
the Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982-2010), in THE USE OF FOREIGN
PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 39 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds. 2013,
2013).
46
47
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what similarities and other features are required to conduct comparative analysis
are important for many tasks. They may be necessary to answer prior to
answering the question of what kind of legal structure best fulfills the normdiffusing sense of constitutionalization. We need to know what basic
constitutional structures are available to spread the norms before we can
determine which spreads them best. This analysis can contribute to legal study
regardless of how often this kind of comparison currently takes place. Infrequent
use of this form of comparison may even make it easier to address questions
about the value of forms of comparison without wading into the political debates
surrounding other forms of comparison. The analysis can guide future decisionmakers faced with situations where strict comparison may be relevant and
provide insight into whether and why current forms of comparison are apt.50
Finally, while I am interested in whether the international legal order is
constitutional in nature, I also study whether a constitutional document, the
Charter, has sufficient constitutional features because it is a candidate central
constitutional document for the most likely international constitutional order and
several scholars argue that it is the international constitution now. Scholars argue
that several documents do, can, or should play the role of international
constitution. Arguments that each fulfills criteria for constitutional documents
are available.51 Yet, several reasons justify focusing on the Charter.
Academically, it is a common candidate in the literature for the world
constitution.52 Testing the Charter’s candidacy thus responds to the literature.
Functionally, the United Nations [U.N.] is the best candidate for an international
community that could be made into a constitutional order. The Charter is its
foundational document and could play a central role in the constitutionalization
of the U.N. system. Legally, Article 103 of the Charter prioritizes Charter
obligations, apparently providing some hierarchical status.53 There is some
indication that the Charter (partly) fulfills some other criteria of constitutions.54
Finally, structurally, the Charter shares enough features with other candidate
constitutions to be instructive for identifying problems other candidates may
face. If the Charter is the best candidate for the constitution of the international
legal order and there are reasons to be skeptical about using it as the lynchpin of
international law as comparative constitutional law, this provides reason to
generally question the use of international law as a comparative constitutional
law source. I thus focus on the Charter, but also explore whether it could
combine with the International Bill of Rights to fulfill the role of a constitutional
document.55

50
My findings bear on academic use of international law in CCL, but I make no claims about
academic comparison beyond implying some limitations thereon.
51
For a less obvious example, many documents claim authority over specific areas of international
law. See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S 185; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
These and similar documents could combine into a multi-part functional international constitution like
many multi-part domestic constitutions.
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Sloan, supra note 2; Dupuy, supra note 2; Fassbender, supra note 2; Gardbaum, supra note 2.
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U.N. Charter art. 103.
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See infra Part IV (and criticisms in Part V).
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My focus on these documents is also emblematic of another way in which my analysis is limited:
I focus primarily on global legal regimes here with the United Nations-based system serving as my
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III. FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS
Comparative constitutional law projects like this require that
comparators share a sufficient number of features to qualify as constitutions and,
thus, subjects of comparison. What are the necessary and sufficient features of a
constitution capable of serving as the subject of comparison? For fairness’s sake,
I defer to those who argue that an international constitution or constitutional
order is sufficiently similar to domestic ones to warrant comparison in many
circumstances. A combination and alteration of Stephen Gardbaum and Bardo
Fassbender’s accounts of the features of candidate constitutions reveal five
features that global constitutions should fulfill if they are going to be like
domestic ones and serve as proper bases of comparison: (a) constituent authority,
(b) hierarchy, (c) entrenchment, (d) enforcement, and (e) bindingness. While one
can question whether any one of these criteria is necessary to have a domestic
constitutional order (and my own views on what is necessary differ from these
proposals), the criteria in Gardbaum and Fassbender are plausible candidates for
at least paradigmatic features of domestic constitutions. Where they are offered
as key features of domestic constitutions by those who make the case for
international law as a source of comparative constitutional law, accepting them
as given for present purposes is fair to the authors who oppose me and the scope
of their arguments. Candidate international constitutions should fulfill at least
most of the five criteria if they are going to be comparators with domestic
constitutions, even by the lights of those who seek to identify international
constitutions.56
Gardbaum and Fassbender make generally plausible cases for these criteria.
Gardbaum states that constitutional documents are generally “made by a special,
episodic, and self-consciously constituent power,” highest in the hierarchy of
laws in an area, and “entrenched against ordinary methods of amendment or
repeal which apply to statutes and other forms of law.”57 He ultimately denies
that “special methods of enforcement” are required,58 but some form of
enforcement is generally required and implicit in Gardbaum’s account. Judicial
review is commonly used to fulfill this requirement in domestic constitutional
orders but is not the universal method of doing so. Fassbender then establishes
that entrenchment is characteristic of constitutions:59 they “almost always
present a complex of fundamental norms governing the organization and
performance of governmental functions in a given state … and the relationship
between state authorities and citizens.”60 Constitutions should then be difficult

primary candidate for a constitutional order. There is, of course, a sense in which regional legal systems
are more “constitutional” than the more global example on which I choose to focus here. But whether
those systems are genuinely “international” is itself a contested issue, so regional systems are not strong
foci for the present inquiry. As I further note below, regional systems are not themselves unified into a
global collection of laws governed by a common “constitution.”
56
But see Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2012);
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 754.
57
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 754.
58
Id.
59
Fassbender, supra note 2, at 537.
60
Id. at 536.
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to terminate or alter. Constitutions thus tend to bind government institutions and
community members alike.61 Even where community members’ actions are not
directly subject to constitutional review, their rights against government are
established through a constitution. These rights are against both the state’s main
organ and any organs created under its primary constitutional authority.
These criteria can, of course, be criticized, but they suffice for present
purposes. For instance, constitutional documents likely do not reflect the “will
of the power” in a way that would reflect a substantive conception of constituent
authority.62 Where some nations recognize that jus cogens norms can supersede
domestic constitutions even from the perspective of domestic constitutional law,
domestic constitutions likely only need to be very high in a hierarchy, rather than
occupying the highest position. Gardbaum’s criteria are otherwise descriptively
and normatively helpful. After all, even imposed constitutions that do not reflect
the will of the people, like that of Japan, are the result of a process that aims to
create the boundaries of constitutional authority for the people on whom it is
imposed. Even persons who impose a constitution through defined procedures
may qualify as a constituent power on a less substantive account. The idea that
all constitutional documents are made at a set time with a certain special purpose
of creating special documents is hardly implausible. Likewise, at least
paradigmatic examples of, if not all, domestic constitutions do seem to at least
purport to have a high place in the state’s hierarchy of laws and to resist change
through regular legislative procedures. Where scholars invoke these plausible
criteria to make cases for an international constitution, invoking them here is
dialectically useful notwithstanding any caveats I would add.
We can then identify features of domestic constitutional orders that an
international equivalent should possess. A constitutional order has these features
regardless of whether they have a specific document with the features in the
preceding paragraph. The pro-international constitutionalization scholars Jan
Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein suggest that a global constitution will
have features that are shared by many constitutions, including political
accountability and a commitment to the rule of law that itself requires separation
of powers, procedural rules, and judicial review.63 These can be understood as
features of constitutional orders, rather than constitutional documents. We can
specify their requirements as (a2) authoritativeness, (b2) a unity of laws, and
(c2) separation of powers. First, constitutional orders are authoritative. The
whole order must fulfill the criteria of hierarchy and bindingness even absent a
specific constitutional document. Otherwise, there is not a proper subject of the
order. Fassbender further specifies that many entities, state and citizen alike,
must be bound for a constitutional order to be complete.64 Second, constitutional
orders unify a body of laws. This follows from what it means to have a
constitutionalized legal system in any sense. Laws need to be unified by a set of

61
Id. at 569–670 (Fassbender further states that they seek to be of indefinite length but notes that this
is not a necessary feature of constitutions and provides a major counterexample. Id. at 578).
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The literature here is voluminous but see Mark Tushnet, Peasants with Pitchforks, and Toilers with
Twitter: Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent Authority, 13 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 639 (2015)
for a representative critical view of constituent authority that views it largely as a legal construct.
63
See Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competences in KLABBERS, PETERS & ULFSTEIN, supra note 1,
at 55–67 [hereinafter Institutions].
64
Fassbender, supra note 2, at 536.
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norms for one sense of constitutionalization to occur. An institution must have
authority over a wide set of legal domains for the other to occur. This unity
requirement also arguably follows from constitutions’ necessary constituent
power and hierarchy. Domestic constitutions always seek to create a community
under the same law and create some higher law unifying others into a discrete
body under one major law to do so. Third, constitutional orders separate
governmental powers. Absent some separation of powers, an entity can usurp
the constitution as the ultimate authority in a domain. Empirically, moreover,
almost all domestic constitutions create distinct roles for different government
bodies.65 This may not require full checks on the authority of each entity, like
those found in liberal-democratic constitutions. But it does require clearly
defined roles and some way to ensure those roles are respected in practice.
Deferring to pro-constitutionalization scholars on these criteria likewise seems
dialectically fair.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE CHARTER AS INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION
There are good faith arguments that there can be an international
constitutional order and that the Charter (on its own or in conjunction with the
International Bill of Rights) is the constitution at its center. I will address three:
the Formal Superiority Argument, the Shared Project Argument, and the
Similarity Argument. Successful versions of these arguments could produce an
order that can be the subject of licit comparison with domestic constitutional
regimes in most cases. If the international order were a genuine constitutional
order, a default position that it should be the subject of comparative
constitutional analysis would be apt. I briefly outline each argument here and
return to them with a more critical stance below.
A. THE FORMAL SUPERIORITY ARGUMENT
The clearest legal argument for the Charter as the constitution of the
international legal system is that it is formally superior to other international
legal documents in public international law. Article 103 states that where “the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail.”66 The Charter is supreme among
“international agreements,” providing it with superiority over other treaties. This
may apply to all U.N. law, including United Nations Security Council [UNSC]

65
Even if “separation of powers” refers to several kinds of things (e.g., GEOFFREY MARSHALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Clarendon Law Series 1971)), constitutional orders must include one to
qualify as a constitutional order like those in domestic regimes. Champions of the constitutionalization
of international law believe this is necessary. My description infra of the powers of entities in the
international community challenges any plausible separation criterion.
66
U.N. Charter art. 103.
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decisions.67 Such a reading supports the view that the provision is at least chief
among many international laws. “International agreement” is not bounded by
the qualifier “U.N.” suggesting the Charter could have some formal superiority
over non-U.N. agreements from the perspective of international law.68 The
Charter thus plays a hierarchical role in international law such that international
law includes something playing a constitutional role. Comparison with the
system it instantiates would be licit if the system were also sufficiently similar
to domestic constitutional orders. Other questions about the aptness of particular
constitutional comparisons would remain, but these questions arise for any
comparative constitutional analysis: the Charter-based international legal
system’s status as a generally acceptable subject for constitutional comparison
would be clear.
B. THE SHARED PROJECT ARGUMENT
Even if the Charter is not formally superior to all international laws, its role
as a foundational document in a project with international and domestic
components could, in turn, still warrant comparison in its domestic parts. The
Shared Project Argument suggests that international law and domestic
constitutional law are part of the same project, which is itself part of a global
constitutional order. This argument, which is most frequently supported in the
narrower domain of international human rights law, is grounded in the temporal
link between and similar content of modern international law and some modern
constitutions. Many modern international law and world constitutions were
created in 1945 or later.69 Many modern constitutions share similar features with
each other and with international human rights law particularly; many such
constitutions were explicitly created with reference to one another or
international human rights law.70 This is sometimes used to explain why
particular international legal documents are part of the same project.71
Comparing parts of the same project is then licit: they are linked in their shared
role in a greater scheme and their definitions of terms reinforce each other. If the
Shared Project Argument succeeds, then at least international human rights laws
are proper bases for comparison with at least constitutional human rights
provisions by default—and the same can be said for the wider legal systems
meant to protect those rights.
C. THE SIMILARITY ARGUMENT
Content-related aspects of the Shared Project Argument also support a
Similarity Argument for comparison. Gardbaum argues that the International
Bill of Rights has international constitutional status.72 Per Gardbaum,

67
See Peter Hilpold, EU Law and UN Law in Conflict: The Kadi Case, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF
U.N. L.141, 161 (2009). See also Fassbender, supra note 2 at 577–578, 586.
68
U.N. Charter art. 103. Positive law suggests otherwise from regional authorities’ perspective.
Hilpold, supra note 67, discusses a classic case.
69
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 750–751.
70
See note 24.
71
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 750–751.
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Id. at 756.
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international human rights law shares a similar structure and content with
domestic constitutional laws and so the International Bill of Rights that
fundamentally grounds it can be the subject of a Shared Project Argument.73 If
so, comparison between at least parts of international law and constitutional law
may be licit. Even if one contested Gardbaum’s empirical bases here, the
international rights register clearly partially overlaps with many post-World War
II [WWII] constitutional rights registries and limitation clauses are clearly
common to both. This suggests that the rights are similar things that can be
compared. The International Bill of Rights could then serve as a constitution if
it had something to support its hierarchical status. Alternatively, the Charter,
while not granting any human rights obligations on its own, could be the
constitution that guarantees these rights through its formal superiority and
prioritization of human rights norms in its interpretation. Comparison with a
system that contains and protects the same kinds of things would be licit by
default. International law could, again, play a central role in comparative
constitutional law.
V. THE CASE AGAINST USING THE CHARTER IN DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL
COMPARISONS
Unfortunately, there are also many reasons not to use international law as a
source of comparative constitutional law. Some are familiar concerns with
domestic use of international law serving new questions. Others are original.
When one applies the criteria for constitutional status to the Charter and the case
for an order like domestic constitutional orders to the Charter-based system, one
sees that (A) the Charter lacks sufficient features to be analogized to a
constitution and (B) the attached international legal order lacks rudimentary
features necessary for being a proper subject of comparison with domestic
constitutional orders. International documents that could purport to be
constitutions, including the Charter, have different statuses and roles in the
international legal system and claimed constitutionalization thereof. The
constitutionalization of law literature suggests that (C) completion of the
constitutionalization process will not remedy (B). There are further conceptual
problems with comparing any international legal order to domestic ones:
international law (D) could be understood as lacking sufficient independence
from domestic law to allow proper comparison and (E) is often just applied in
domestic contexts rather than serving as a basis for comparison. Moreover,
returning to arguments in the preceding section, (F) the case for the Shared
Content Argument is overstated and (G) the history behind the Shared Project
Argument limits its application. These arguments at least suggest that the bar for
establishing that comparison between international and domestic constitutional
legal phenomena is higher than many suppose. They also provide some (clearly
inconclusive) reasons to be skeptical about the aptness of many comparisons
and, further, suggest that many apt comparisons are not exercises in comparative
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constitutional law but are instead other kinds of legal analyses and may
accordingly operate according to different norms than comparative
constitutional law alone.
A. THE CHARTER LACKS KEY CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES
It is not clear that the Charter has the constitutional features proponents of
the constitutionalization of international law claim are distinctive of domestic
constitutions and plausibly necessary for proper comparison: (a) constituent
authority, (b) hierarchy, (c) entrenchment, (d) enforcement, and (e) bindingness.
At minimum, the Charter’s attendant legal order only fulfills a few of these
components—and, even then, often does so to a lesser degree than at least
paradigmatic domestic constitutions. Comparing constitutional documents with
the Charter is thus non-ideal and it would be surprising if the quasi-constitutional
Charter-centered order would be a proper comparator for domestic constitutioncentered orders. This alone suggests that one should take caution before
comparing the documents or orders at issue. While the case for each feature of
a domestic constitution—and, indeed, each feature of a constitutional order in
subsection (B)—could also be the topic of its own work, brief suggestive
remarks on each provides ample reason to question the case for the Charter’s
constitutionality and, by extension, the case for regular use of the document in
comparative constitutional law.
1. Constituent Authority
It is at best controversial to suggest that the Charter has constituent authority
for the international legal community. Gardbaum grants that there is “no general
conception of a constituent power at the international legal level.”74 The Charter
arguably was not intended to be a world constitution in 1945.75 There is some
evidence that some observers viewed the drafting process as a “constitutional
moment.”76 Fassbender points to the use of the term “Charter” rather than
“Covenant” and the use of the opening phrase “We the Peoples of the United
Nations,” rather than “The High Contracting Parties,” as further evidence of its
intended constitutionality.77 Yet, even if the Charter was a “special, episodic,
and self-consciously constituent power” in the creation of the U.N., it is unlikely
that it was intended to be the constituent authority for the international
community at large. Several international legal documents are “Charters” or
even “Constitutions” so the naming convention does not make it unique.78 Even
proponents of the Charter’s constitutionality grant that the preambulatory
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language plays no role in the development.79 Interpretation of other constitutions
and the language Fassbender highlights may intend to identify the Charter’s
importance rather than its constitutional or hierarchical status. These three brief
points are representative of the issues facing a case for constituent authority.80
Even if the creation of the Charter—or some other international document—
does not qualify as the passage of a special law for a special purpose, whether
that purpose was the creation of a constitutional order remains at best debatable.
There is at least a difference in degree, if not kind, in the extent to which the
international legal system meets this criterion for constitutionality. The degree
to which it is fulfilled then likely only pertains to the U.N. system and whether
the members of the U.N. constitute the relevant community for comparative
purposes is debatable.
2. Hierarchy
The hierarchical status of the Charter is then not as straightforward as the
Formal Superiority Argument suggests. There is a much stronger argument that
this feature is lacking. Article 103 presents some problems on its own. The
hierarchical status for “legal obligations” language in the text is narrower than
the language in many constitutions that are supposed to form the basis of the
Shared Project Argument. Compare article 103 of the Charter with subsection
52(1) of Canada’s most recent constitutional document:
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of
the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
or effect.81
Then compare with section 2 of South Africa’s constitution:
2. This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations
imposed by it must be fulfilled.82
“Any law” is broader than “legal obligations.” “Law or conduct” is broader still.
The invalidity language in the domestic constitutional provisions is stronger than
the language suggesting that the Charter “shall prevail” in cases of conflict. Any
apparent Charter hierarchy thus applies to a narrower set of legal phenomena
and has less actual impact than the hierarchy of domestic constitutions. This
provides reason to question whether the documents are proper comparators.
Further problems arise when considering the relationship between the
Charter and non-treaty international law. Even if we grant that “any other
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international agreement” includes UNSC decisions,83 the provision is silent on
customary international law.84 The fraught relationship between Charter norms
and jus cogens norms and questions about which is superior also raises
problems.85 The Charter may not include all jus cogens norms.86 Such norms
could be superior despite this lack. A question about whether the Charter is
hierarchically superior to jus cogens norms thus remains even if we can resolve
concerns about its superiority over non-treaty laws like custom. The fact that
regional courts that are plausibly international do not apply Charter-based law
that conflicts with what they take to be superior, arguably jus cogens, human
rights norms further suggests that recognition of the Charter as supreme is not
as common as one may think.87
Questions about the formal superiority of the Charter over other norms are
particularly complicated when human rights are involved. The lack of a
normative hierarchy in international human rights law is widely noted.88 Yet the
supremacy of human rights norms is distinctive of the model grounding the
Shared Project Argument.89 The relative status of Charter, human rights, and jus
cogens norms in international law is thus famously vexing. The Charter alone
cannot protect human rights and article 103 famously does not contain human
rights norms.90 It is arguably unclear whether the Charter can adequately protect
them in tandem with other laws. The ICCPR and ICESCR are quasiconstitutional since interpretative rules suggest we should read other laws in
light of them, but they are not formally supreme in conflict cases.91 Some, but
not all, international human rights are jus cogens norms. The Charter’s
superiority over human rights norms, jus cogens or otherwise, or jus cogens
norms generally remains contestable. So too does its constitutionality. The U.N.based human rights law system likely has sufficient rules and authorities to
address some of these concerns, but controversy on what qualifies as hierarchy
is understandable. The issue does seem to differ from that of domestic
constitutional equivalents.
3. Entrenchment
Entrenchment of the Charter is, in turn, also at best weaker than that of many
domestic constitutions. No termination provisions allowing for the end of the
U.N. system or of Charter application are included in the Charter.92 Yet special
amendment procedures are also lacking.93 Practically, the Charter is sufficiently
foundational to the U.N. that amendment would likely need to take place
alongside amendment of other international legal documents. But this is true of
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many international legal documents and does not make the Charter specially
entrenched. This feature ultimately appears missing for nearly any candidate
international constitution. Among candidate constitutions, only the ICCPR
appears to have special amendment requirements.94
4. Enforcement
The lack of enforcement of international laws generally is, of course,
famous. No one enforces most international legal judicial decisions.95
International courts cannot even make decisions that would “enforce” many
international laws through judicial pronouncement. Most notably, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) cannot invalidate laws, in contrast to, e.g.,
aforementioned German, Canadian, and South African courts.96 The ICJ’s
limited jurisdiction creates even greater limits on its enforcement capabilities.
Blaine Sloan identifies the lack of compulsory jurisdiction for the ICJ and
interpretive principles as severe limits on judicial review of the Charter; he then
notes that only states can appear before the court.97 While not all domestic courts
have unlimited jurisdiction,98 the ICJ’s jurisdiction is more limited than most
domestic apex courts. Other international courts have even more limited
jurisdiction, often focusing only on certain subject matters, and only having
jurisdiction over parties who explicitly agreed to be bound by their decisions.
Any international law “enforcement” authorities have minimal powers.
The concern about a lack enforcement is not reducible to concerns about the
lack of judicial review under the Charter, VCLT, and ICCPR alone.99 Those
concerns does not suffice to differentiate the international legal order and
domestic constitutional orders on its own where some domestic constitutional
orders do not include judicial review either. Rather, the lack of enforcement
jurisdiction in each of these cases highlights a broader issue with the
international legal order: no one has an uncontroversial enforcement power in
the international legal order. Extra-judicial attempts accordingly engender
significant controversy. Where, in turn, acts by some international bodies and
individual members likely qualify as enforcement measures, the enforcement
measures still differ from domestic ones in significant ways. These differences
alone also do not suffice to suggest that comparison between orders is inapt. But
they do at least serve as potential differences that can and likely do combine with
more significant ones to present a case against presuming that comparison
between the different sphere is necessarily apt.
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5. Bindingness
Finally, the Charter is also less widely binding than domestic constitutions.
It only binds states and really only U.N. member states. Being bound is voluntary
in a way that being bound by domestic constitutions usually is not.
Constitutional laws also tend to bind all public entities that are created under
their auspices. This is not true of international quasi-constitutions. For an
example of a more broadly binding constitution, return to South Africa. Its
constitutional Bill of Rights “applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.”100 All state entities are bound.
International law, by contrast, generally does not bind many international
organizations created under its authority.101 Gardbaum admits that compared
with “domestic and supranational [e.g., European Union (E.U.)] constitutional
law, this is a significant limitation on constitutional status. It is hard to conceive
of [domestic or supranational] bills of rights not binding the political institutions
created by a constitution.”102 This critique applies to the Charter, which only
binds member states, not other institutions within it.103
The U.N. also may not bind regional state-like entities with large roles in
international law,104 creating further disanalogies between international and
domestic “constitutions.” This is especially clear in cases where this is a conflict
between (ostensibly international) regional law and paradigmatically
international law. The classic European Court of Human Rights judgment in
Kadi, which held that the E.U. is not bound by international law in cases of
conflict between it and E.U. law (at least when E.U. law instantiates human
rights or jus cogens norms) is arguably an example.105 Alternatively, if E.U. law
is a form of international law, Kadi is an example of a case where the Charter
law is subservient to other international laws. Klabbers reads the case as
addressing “whether the United Nations (UN) Charter is hierarchically superior
to other international institutions, including the EU itself,” with the European
Court of Human Rights coming to a negative answer.106 The Charter-based
system remains non-constitutional.
Methods of resolving this issue may not rely on something with structural
features resembling those of modern constitutions and so may not produce a
proper comparator for many circumstances even in the future.107 A global
federalist constitution is conceptually possible and could be compared easily
with local constitutions in federalist states. But the possibility of such an entity
may be as remote as that of any world constitutional order.108 Even then,
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construction of such a body presages comparison. The output would be
something that would be informed by domestic laws, not something that could
easily inform how they ought to be interpreted.109
B. THE LARGER INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS STRUCTURALLY DISSIMILAR FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS
Domestic opposition to the use of international materials in domestic
adjudication partially stems from the identification of what could be deemed a
constitutional lack in international law. Beyond domestic concerns about a
supranational court adjudicating above each nation’s highest courts, there is a
concern that international law is an incomplete system. Kadi is also an example
here.110 For critics, this lack offers an example of why international materials
should not be examined by domestic courts. This concern can be applied to the
international legal system regardless of what we identify as the “constitution” of
that system. The international legal order struggles with all three criteria for
domestic systems outlined above. When combined with concerns in the
preceding subsection, this should at least highlight the need for caution in using
international law as a source for comparative constitutional analysis.
1. Authoritativeness
An authoritative international legal order is lacking. Even those who
recognize the constitutionalization of international law recognize that treaties are
not constitutions and most candidates are mere treaties.111 They further suggest
that candidates like the Charter and the VCLT cannot fulfill that role since they
only apply to states and do not even bind all of those.112 No treaty serves the
functions of clear hierarchy and wide bindingness distinctive of constitutions. It
is formally possible for the order to be authoritative absent a single authoritative
document. But the international legal order generally seems to lack the broad
hierarchy and bindingness distinctive of domestic constitutional orders.
International law is not directly authoritative even within states, its purported
subjects. This is especially true in dualist states where the law does not actually
bind domestic actors until implemented into domestic law. Yet Kadi and Kadilike cases show that regional and domestic actors do not always view the
international law as authoritative.113 Moreover, the system generally does not
bind all actors that constitutional courts may bind. Recall that South Africa’s
constitution “binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of
state.”114 International law does not similarly bind all agents. The features of
hierarchy and wide bindingness appear missing in the general system. While
international law has rules for what qualifies as being a good actor within the
system and these provide normative guidance to the actors within it, those rules
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do not operate like their domestic constitutional “equivalents” in practice. This
too should provide reason to question the broader system’s “constitutional”
status.
2. A Unity of Laws
The oft-noted fragmentation of international law makes it structurally
dissimilar to constitutional law, undermining the case for comparison by
domestic courts. Gardbaum admits that the lack of a single international human
rights law system or source of international human rights law complicates his
argument that the International Bill of Rights should be the global constitution.
Gardbaum’s worry suggests another feature of constitutional orders implicit in
the hierarchy conditions for constitutions: a unified system of laws for it to
regulate. Fragmentation makes this difficult to identify in the international legal
system. On one definition, fragmentation is the phenomenon whereby
international law is not a singular entity but several legal entities lacking a clear
overarching structure or even a clear conflicts of law solution.115 It is clear that
“various aspects of the international legal regime are branching out and gaining
some form of quasi-independence.”116 Given the fragmentation of international
law and the lack of any legal entity therein to overcome it, international law as
a whole lacks a single constitution. This lack is particularly clear from an
international organizations perspective. There is a constitution for human rights
bodies, a constitution for trade bodies, etc. These constitutions are not clearly
linked by some broader constitution. It is unlikely that all are constituent in a
way that would let them jointly serve as a global constitution. As noted above,
many bodies created by these documents are not bound by candidate
constitutions like the Charter. Domestic constitutions, by contrast, generally
apply to all areas of law and all public bodies. Likewise, international law is
often adjudicated and implemented by diverse treaty bodies.117 International
tribunals are not organized in a hierarchical order.118 This is another formal
difference. There is usually a clear person with authority for adjudicating
constitutional claims in domestic jurisdictions.119 Of course, not all domestic
constitutions are included in a singular source—oft-studies constitutions like
those in Canada and Israel feature multiple components120—but domestic
constitutions do at least seek to unify all laws under a singular constitutional
order. Thus, Canada and Israel read their respective constitutions holistically and
view all of their constitutional documents as applying to and unifying all laws
in their states under a common framework.121 Human rights documents are
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useful in their domain but do not clearly fulfill the same role in the fragmented
international legal arena.
While international bodies have some constitutional elements, this at most
suggests that international law ought to have the form of a domestic constitution
and does not establish that constitutional law should look like international
law.122 Arguments that sub-components of international law are themselves
becoming “constitutionalized” further challenge the sense in which the
international legal system is a constitutional order.123 International law purports
to be a full system that unifies all subsystems. If the subsystems are complete
constitutional orders—and there is at least an argument that international trade
law is on a par with international law in its ability to establish this claim124—
unity of laws is lacking. Each system may be capable of serving as a closed
normative order but comparing “international law” with constitutional orders
will be inapt. If the subsystems are only constitutionalizing in the norm-diffusing
sense, in turn, one worries that they are creating a larger subsystem linked only
by the norms. The larger problem is that the constitutionalization—in any
form—of what we take to be subsystems of international law seems to highlight
the independence of these areas of law. This raises questions about the existence
of international law as a unified whole or at least one unified like domestic
spheres. It would be odd to compare domestic constitutional law and domestic
or foreign intellectual property law to solve a domestic constitutional case. Yet,
if international intellectual property law is constitutional in nature too, we would
be warranted in comparing our domestic constitutional law with the international
intellectual property law system if we were warranted in comparing it with
international law simpliciter and both were constitutional in the same way. We
would then also be warranted in comparing Charter-based law and World Trade
Organization law to decide international constitutional cases. This would take
us far from modern legal practice.
Attempts to resolve these fragmentation-based problems are compelling but
face limits. Gardbaum suggests that there will be few conflicts in practice and
the lack of international courts to resolve them is an easy practical conflict to
resolve.125 Yet this theoretical issue raises questions about the practical utility of
international law as a comparator. Fassbender argues that the Charter should be
the primary constitution and other documents, like the International Bill of
Rights, should be accorded constitutional status only insofar as they pursue the
foundational Charter’s aims.126 However, other scholars note that recognition of
a world constitution of universal enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to gain
political support. Klabbers, Ulfstein, and Peters suggest that fragmentation may
not be per se problematic from a constitutional perspective as pluralist
constitutionalism in which there are multiple sites of constitutional authority and
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forms of constitutional entities could exist in the international sphere.127
Fassbender sometimes makes similar proscriptions, despite his general view that
the Charter could be the constitution for all international law.128 Implicit in these
claims is a view that domestic constitutions are likewise pluralistic in nature. Yet
I am unclear on where such pluralistic constitutions exist. The classic example,
the E.U.,129 is just as easily described as a site of international law as of domestic
constitutional law. While acknowledging those regional entities as international
bodies then presents arguable sites of unified laws, even the unified regional
legal regimes are not themselves unified into a broader international corpus.
Other examples are arguably burgeoning,130 but the arguments in this area
remain fierce. Aptness still cannot yet be assumed.
3. Separation of Powers
Finally, there is a weak sense in which the U.N. fulfills the separation of
powers criterion insofar as all U.N. bodies have defined powers, but the roles of
U.N. bodies and their attendant powers do not clearly map those found in
domestic constitutional orders and actually seem to overlap in ways that make
the international and domestic cases disanalogous and raise questions about
whether the powers at the U.N. are separated like paradigmatic constitutional
powers.
The UNSC is the best candidate for global executive,131 but it only briefly,
if ever, played the role of global executive free from challenge.132 Its other
functions make it legislative and even quasi-judicial in a manner that undermines
any claimed separation of powers.133 The UNSC appears to be the only
uncontroversial lawmaker in the U.N. and then only in the domain of laws
necessary for “international peace and security.”134 If one (plausibly)
acknowledges the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as a law-making
legislature, further problems arise. The UNGA and the UNSC then both hold
law-making powers, but only in limited areas, and are frequently free from
judicial review. These examples are representative of the general phenomenon
whereby “the principle of separation of powers does not apply to the organs of
international organizations.”135 The lack of judicial checks on the UNSC raises
concerns even if we have an executive.136 Under the Charter, neither the UNSC
nor the ICJ holds any real check on the others’ power.137 The separation of
powers at the international quasi-constitutional level and within the international
organizations that would hold the powers in such an order does not map onto
established domestic norms, creating disanalogies. Even Fassbender admits that
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the UNSC’s multi-faceted and broad role “does not allow us to speak of a true
separation of powers in the” U.N.138 Treaty bodies and soft law organizations
have different forms still.139
Unlike in domestic constitutional orders, there also does not appear to be
one authoritative interpreter of the Charter: the UNSC, UNGA, and ICJ all play
interpretive roles.140 The ICJ then famously faces many limits on its jurisdiction
and its review powers.141 The fact that there are many different fora to make the
claims that are available and many existing international tribunals where claims
are made are not subject to common constitutional constraints on adjudicators
sourced in judicial independence further undermines the extent to which
constitutional norms of domestic constitutionalism are realized in international
law.142 Focusing on one interpreter could be helpful for understanding some
phenomena, but questions about whether they serve the same role as domestic
“equivalents” will remain. The fact that domestic courts look to other domestic
courts to understand the content of international law suggests that domestic
courts too play an interpretative role.143 Thus, this form of interpretation
complicates the comparative enterprise regardless of whether it actually
provides a good account of “international law” on its own terms.
Fragmentation also disperses powers among many organizations. There is
no clear hierarchy and some overlap between them. States show no interest in
resisting fragmentation by giving particular organizations supremacy or creating
a new system of organizations that integrates existing ones.144 Proponents of
constitutionalism suggest an apex court is unlikely in this sphere; the functional
constitutional order they promote instead will again likely lack the structural
form of many domestic constitutions since the functionality they discuss is
primarily goal-based.145 There is ultimately “no reason for arguing that the
constitutional principles of international organizations should be similar to those
known from the domestic context.”146 Again, spheres of international law may
have their own hierarchies and rules and may provide insight into various
normative phenomena, but they will importantly differ from domestic
constitutional orders.
C. FUTURE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS ARE LIKELY TO DIFFER
FROM DOMESTIC EQUIVALENTS
The forgoing structural issues may explain why scholars view the
constitutionalization of international law as incomplete. The incompleteness of
the international “constitutional” order provides reason not to compare that order
with domestic constitutional ones, particularly in high stakes scenarios of
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judicial pronouncements. Incomplete constitutions should likely only be
compared with each other. Comparison with an incomplete constitutional order
that is not even obviously constitutional should be rare. An incomplete candidate
constitution whose status remains controversial is unlikely to tell us much about
constitutions generally. This may also explain why a leading proponent of the
view that the Charter is a global constitution sometimes makes his claim
metaphorical, rather than actual.147 The metaphor informs international law.
Constitutional law is a given. The metaphor only makes sense when contrasted
with that given.
Unfortunately for some, there is also reason to suggest that future
international constitutional orders will differ from current domestic ones and codevelopment of the international and domestic that would warrant a norm of
comparison is not taking place. Recall the distinction between the legal ordering
and norm-diffusing senses of constitutionalization. It should now be clear that
the constitutionalization of international law is not constitutionalization in the
legal ordering sense. This may be apt if the primary aim of constitutionalization
is spreading certain norms. Recall that the legal ordering sense of
constitutionalization may not be the best method of realizing the norm-diffusing
sense.148 The defects with the Charter and the order surrounding it outlined
above are unlikely to be remedied in circumstances likely to arise soon. Klabbers
granted that we likely will not ever have a formal global constitution in 2009.149
Skepticism about universal binding norms has only grown since. While
Fassbender argues that a global constitution is possible, he thinks that the ideal
of such a constitution will break from its origins in comparison with domestic
constitutions.150 This could produce something unlike (even future) domestic
constitutions and so not a proper source of comparison in many circumstances.
If we get some complete form of international constitutionalization in the
future, it may help deal with fragmentation issues.151 But the output likely will
not resemble constitutions in the domestic sphere. Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein
establish that having the same “constitutional features” does not entail having
the same constitutional structure. They state that the global constitution that will
have these features will not be contained in a single document and will be
“pluralist” in nature.152 Both features make possible global constitutions unlike
many domestic constitutions. The pluralist criterion is more worrisome.
Domestic constitutions allow for multi-sectoral coverage. Yet, even then,
pluralism operates differently in domestic and international cases since
international organizations affect member states. To the extent that domestic
orders are becoming pluralist, international constitutionalization still differs and
is far from being realized. It is still unclear whether an international
constitutional legal order exists and it is now unclear whether the form that will
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exist in the future will be an appropriate comparator in many cases since
domestic pluralist constitutions are at best difficult to identify. The judicial
comparison at issue is still rarely going to be licit since we will not be comparing
things that are even developing similarly. Future licit comparison is also unlikely
to be possible in at least high stakes scenarios where we cannot afford inapt
comparison and the case for aptness cannot clearly be assumed.
D. DOMESTIC LEGAL PRACTICE UNDERMINES THE CASE FOR COMPARISON
Domestic courts’ role in the development of foreign and international law
also differs in a way that suggests that the respective legal orders are distinct. A
Canadian court can cite German law to examine how Canadian law should
develop or as a source of common provenance. But Canadian judges have no
special authority in German law and do not directly develop German law.
Canadian courts do, however, apply international law. They are understood to
have special knowledge of at least aspects of that law in a way that contributes
to development of international law through interpretation of its national
implications and as evidence of state practice that international courts use to
establish parts of the law. Unfortunately, many courts’ comparative practices are
sometimes problematically unsystematic.153 There is then good practical reason
for judges not to involve international law in comparative judgments where such
judgments could impact the development of international law: potential effects
of poor comparison are greater where domestic courts impact the development
of a third party (here international) legal system.
The role of domestic courts in international law also provides further
evidence of the lack of one authority on international law, making it more
difficult to point to the body of international law that is the proper comparator.
Comparative international law suggests that “international law” may not be one
set of legal proscriptions with which one can compare one’s own system.154 This
is, of course, a controversial claim—I myself am ambivalent about it—but the
possibility that these domains cannot be adequately separated should provide
ample reason for comparative caution.
Fragmentation, in other words, may also undermine comparison insofar as
the content of international law requires domestic courts to implement it.
Domestic courts create international law and translate it into domestic law.155
This could suggest that there is no standalone body of international law
independent of domestic law with which domestic law can be compared. If
international law is partly an aspect of domestic law even from the standpoint of
international law, the most we can say is comparison of international law and
constitutional law is like comparison between domestic tort law and
constitutional law. Such a comparison would then be purely domestic and so not
comparative law (constitutional or otherwise) in its classic or modern forms.
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E. COMPARISON IN MONIST STATES MAY JUST BE APPLICATION OF
DOMESTIC LAW
The possibility of widespread apt comparison is further constrained by the
reality that international law that has become a binding part of a state’s law will
need to be applied directly and so cannot properly be part of a comparative
analysis. Domestically too, then, there will often be a lack of independent
existence of the domestic and international laws that one would like to compare.
One can compare how the law operates in the international system with how it
operates in the domestic system or one can compare how it operates in one’s
domestic jurisdiction and another’s, but the former is likely illicit where the
international law is truly binding since it would admit that one is refusing to
apply binding law and the latter is a project in comparative domestic law or
comparative international law rather than a comparison between the domestic
and international laws. One can compare how the law operated in the
international legal system with how it operates in the domestic system, but only
the domestic sense is binding. Other reasons to question whether that
comparison is going to be enlightening appear above. This may be a weak
argument against comparison generally, but it does limit when judges especially
can use it (if there is an independent international “constitutional” order with
which comparison could be possible).
F. THE CHARTER ALONE DOES NOT SUPPORT OVERLAP ARGUMENTS
Independent of the strength of the preceding arguments against comparison,
there is reason to question some arguments for comparison. These potential
weaknesses further support caution in the use of international law as a
comparator and undermine a default position that comparison is apt, especially
in high stakes cases. Where these weaknesses suggest that the international and
domestic constitutional projects differ, they also raise questions about the proper
standards of comparison between them. The underlying tensions cannot be
resolved by simply pointing to the standards of comparative “constitutional” law
alone if the international is not truly constitutional.
Consider the “overlap” in the Shared Project and Similarity Arguments. The
Charter does not protect much of what we want constitutions to protect and what
many constitutions do protect. It contains no explicit human rights
obligations.156 It thus does not grant many of the rights that international law is
often used to help explain.157 The similarity between the content of international
human rights law and domestic constitutions that could ground a claim for the
International Bill of Rights as a global constitution thus undermines the case for
the Charter’s centrality. The Charter could combine with other documents to
fulfill this role in a manner that may also support the Shared Project Argument
above, but other candidate constitutional documents that could combine with it
also present problems. For example, recall Gardbaum’s claim that the
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International Bill of Rights has international constitutional status.158 Gardbaum
identifies four similarities between international human rights and domestic
constitutional rights: both (1) “perform the same basic function of stating limits
on what governments may do in their jurisdiction,” (2) are roughly the same age,
(3) have roughly the same content (viz., recognize roughly the same roster of
rights (with exceptions in the ICESCR)), and (4) contain only a few peremptory
norms with most being derogable and subject to limitation.159 Gardbaum does
not provide much empirical support for (1)-(4). There is reason to question each.
For instance, the functions of the “constitutions” and nature of the orders in
which they operate differ greatly and substantial structural differences make the
comparisons even in (perhaps counterfactual) cases where (4) is true less than
ideal. Gardbaum himself identifies the non-binding status of the UDHR and the
lack of enforcement of many international human rights or even quasiconstitutional status for international bills of rights as clear limitations on
recognizing international human rights as global constitutional rights.160 Given
these problems, it is unlikely that the International Bill of Rights or the Charter
can ground a Shared Content Argument either individually or combined. Any
lingering differences need to be addressed when designing a comparative
methodology for any licit comparisons between the spheres one may draw.
G. THE SHARED PROJECT ARGUMENT HAS LIMITED APPLICATION
Finally, the most plausible versions of the Shared Project Argument only
grounds a few licit comparisons, undermining any claimed centrality for
international law in comparative constitutional law. For instance, some domestic
constitutions do contain the mix of peremptory and non-peremptory norms and
limitation clauses distinctive of post-WWII international law,161 but this only
warrants comparison in nations with those features. Differences between them
and the pre-WWII nature of many parts of other constitutions undermine the
general case for comparison. For instance, many domestic rights, including
controversial ones, predate their international equivalents. Consider the preWorld War II recognition of social rights in many Latin American nations.162
Widespread domestic recognition of many rights is also not contemporaneous
with international recognition. Domestic rates of recognition of many economic,
social, and cultural rights did not grow substantially after their international
recognition in the 1960s. Recognition is still missing in many nations. The extent
to which mutual citation by domestic courts and the use of foreign law clerks is
an instantiation of international legal norms is also open to debate. Some shared
history between international human rights and many modern domestic
constitutions may support the thesis that the respective legal orders are part of a
common history. Nonetheless, even this only applies to some countries.
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Structural differences will again make this appeal problematic, and nations that
explicitly link the projects by making international law part of their domestic
laws then face the problem in (E).

VI. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
The above should contribute to the understanding of the relationship
between international law and comparative constitutional law and (at least) its
implications for judicial practice. Objections linger. I will address three
objections briefly before concluding with necessarily tentative remarks. First,
one may object that the Charter is not the best candidate for the international
constitution. A powerful line of argument states that the constitution of
international human rights law is sufficiently similar to domestic constitutions
to warrant comparison.163 Yet the forgoing demonstrated that the larger
international order lacks constitutional features regardless of what document
would serve as its constitution. Fragmentation and enforcement issues are
particularly widespread. I also discussed limitations with using the International
Bill of Rights as a constitution.164 Indeed, I actually think that it serves as the
basis for a sub-system in which international human rights law operates as a
closed normative order that can provide insight into important normative
phenomena, but that sub-system still differs from domestic constitutional orders
and its insights may not be directly importable to domestic legal decisions for
several reasons outlined above. While I did not discuss the VCLT in detail, it is
a treaty and thus likely lacks requisite constituent authority despite its formal
status as the document that otherwise establishes the hierarchical ordering of
constitutional law. I grant that jus cogens or erga omnes norms fulfill several
criteria above, including hierarchy and bindingness. While I find them
intuitively problematic as constitutions, whether they can be the basis of a global
constitutional order would admittedly require more work elsewhere.165
Second, one may argue that my criteria above are too demanding.
Fassbender, for one, claims that the hierarchy of norms is a new feature of
constitutions that began in the eighteenth century.166 However, I identified these
criteria by consulting sources that claim that international law has something
like a domestic constitution. This is dialectically fair. I think some combination
of the criteria is plausible. The Charter and the system connected to it fails to
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fulfill the demands of any plausible combination. The hierarchy criterion is
nonetheless important enough to require a response here. If hierarchy is not
required, one may question whether a unity of laws is required. The case against
comparison from fragmentation would then falter. Yet if even most modern
constitutions have this feature and international law’s candidate constitution and
the international legal order does not, this provides reason not to compare
modern constitutions or constitutional orders and the international would-be
equivalents. Some claims that domestic constitutions are becoming pluralistic
notwithstanding,167 modern domestic constitutions that we see in most
constitutional comparisons are hierarchical and unify laws. A demandingness
objection sourced in practical considerations also misses the mark. There is
admittedly a strong case to be made that appealing to international legal orders
can produce good outcomes that will protect foundational constitutional
norms.168 If successful, it provides practical reason to cite international law and
may provide reason to do so comparatively. From this perspective, my limit may
seem overdemanding: it makes it more difficult to protect important things.
While I grant this, my primary interest is knowledge production and reasoned
judgments. Suggested practical reasons for comparison will usually be defeated
by the normative reasons above, especially given bad law’s practical disutility.
Relatedly, third, and finally, one may argue that this makes judges unable to
fulfill many of their important comparative tasks. An idealized picture of the
field identifies (at least) nine goals of comparative constitutional analysis,
including (a) curiosity, (b) legal tool identification and understanding, (c)
understanding legal tool selection, (d) mapping the history of ideas, (e) theory
building, (f) norm identification, (g) taxonomy, (h) harmonization, and (i)
determining cases.169 Perhaps our comparison fulfills these aims? I take this
objection most seriously. I must ultimately grant that international law has a role
to play in comparative constitutional law. But the preceding does suggest that
the nature of this role cannot be easily adduced, and that the role may be less
central than many would expect. Where the international legal system appears
inadequately constitutional, one should exercise caution when invoking
international law for comparative constitutional law purposes. The preceding
could admittedly be clearer on the specifics of what this requires. But a few
implications do immediately present themselves. While I must be suggestive
here due to space constraints, these implications are worth exploring further in
other (methodological) works.
One implication of the forgoing is that not all comparisons between
international and domestic constitutional orders are likely to fulfill comparative
constitutional law purposes and that even some licit comparisons between the
orders that could fulfill those purposes may not actually be best understood as
comparative constitutional law properly-so-called. The preceding does not entail
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that all comparisons between international law and constitutional law are
inappropriate. Comparison may be necessary to determine whether international
law has constitutional features. Even the question that animates this work
requires some comparison. It is, moreover, worth exploring whether any
mainstream existing comparative constitutional law projects can still use
international law as a source of analysis. Indeed, I suspect that there are many
ways in which comparison could be useful. The international and domestic
constitutional systems do face common problems and contain some similar, if
not identical, concepts.170 Some constitutional phenomena are meant to directly
incorporate or mirror international legal phenomena.171 International law is
accordingly clearly relevant for understanding what legal tools are available to
address different issues and for understanding the history of some legal ideas, if
not an underlying theory of what the concepts are supposed to mean. Where
there is direct borrowing of international legal concepts in the domestic sphere,
international law is plausibly necessary for understanding the relevant
constitutional norm.
One should accordingly not take the preceding words of caution as
suggesting more than they do: I propose that the presumption that comparison is
apt is undermotivated and that not all forms of comparison qualify as
comparative constitutional analysis. That suggestion is far from assuming that
comparison between the spheres is always illicit or even that international legal
phenomena are irrelevant to some of the traditional tasks of comparative
constitutional legal analysis. But assumptions to the contrary now appear equally
problematic. If the international system is not constitutional, then its ability to
shed light on constitutional concerns can no longer be taken for granted. The
onus should instead be on those who seek to explain why non-constitutional
phenomena are relevant comparators apt to provide insight into constitutional
phenomena and fulfill relevant purposes. This alone is a methodologically
important finding. Yet the forgoing concerns about the constitutionality of
international law and international law’s implications in the domestic
constitutional realities of many states further suggest that assumptions that any
such comparisons are best understood as exercises in comparative constitutional
law are also questionable and require reconsideration. This has implications not
only for our understanding of the constitutionality of the international legal order
but for our understanding of the contours of comparative constitutional law.
Comparative constitutional law is now severable from international law. Its
textbooks should accordingly focus primarily on domestic constitutions—or
perhaps regional ones—and should admit the international legal order only as a
peripheral case. This skepticism further provides reason to question whether the
norms of comparative constitutional law apply to comparisons between the
international and domestic constitutional spheres or if some other set of norms
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are necessary. Giving up on many assumptions tied to the constitutionality of
the international legal order opens many new and important research paths at the
same time that they foreclose easy access to simple comparisons.
Finally, returning to my central case, the preceding offers some evidence
that judicial use of such comparison should still be limited at best. The stakes of
judicial determinations are too high to determine constitutional cases based on
comparison between the international and domestic. Few other purposes are
within the domain of the judiciary. Many within their domain are not in it in a
way that allows comparison. Judges particularly should not be seeking
comparison for the sake of curiosity and taxonomy. Identifying patterns of use
of legal tools is irrelevant to domestic decision-making of most forms and judges
should not compare to identify legal tools, since the only legal tools they have
are the rules of reasoning and remedial rules in their domain. Appealing to
international law will be apt for understanding international legal tools and
understanding the history of ideas, but this will rarely be helpful for deciding
cases on domestic legal phenomena absent the historical and functional links
required to get to such a high stakes scenario. Even when judges look to other
jurisdictions to establish that foreign phenomena could work in a jurisdiction to,
for instance, help establish whether a limitation on a derogable right is justified,
they must appeal to jurisdictions that are similar enough to allow us to say they
could work here.172 The international order is too different from domestic ones
to allow this. Judges can harmonize constitutional and international laws only
when they have the authority to do so. Use of this authority will often lead to
application of international law. A lack of authority may bar comparison.
Comparison may be helpful for theory-building, but legal theories that can
resolve cases may not give international law special support absent clear links
between the international and domestic spheres that either make the analysis
purely domestic or establish that we are in a case where the Shared Project
Argument applies and international law does not apply domestically. It should
be clear, for instance, that international human rights law particularly reflects
the considered (if politicized) judgments of intelligent people on what certain
concepts should include. This does not provide it with special moral authority
over other regimes that ought to be recognized as a matter of law. Using
international human rights law as a legal source, especially as a source for
comparative law, is different. Given the preceding, we may question whether we
should use it for legal purposes. At minimum, a sense of caution is clearly
needed. While one may question whether so much ink needed to be spilled to
get to this point, a simple reminder of this fact has clear value.
CONCLUSION
The best candidate for an international constitution lacks core constitutional
features and the larger international legal order lacks core features of domestic
constitutional orders. These structural differences mean that there is no

172

See generally Hirschl, supra note 26 (discussing case selection).

172

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:2

international constitutional law that is sufficiently similar to domestic
constitutional laws to warrant comparison that reliably provides new
information about constitutional phenomena. International law may lack
independent existence from domestic law that would allow it to serve as a basis
of true comparison and many licit forms of would-be comparison are ultimately
just applications of domestic law. One should accordingly take care when
conducting comparisons between the international and domestic constitutional
spheres and should recognize that licit comparison is not best described as
comparative constitutional law but another interpretive exercise subject to its
own norms of conduct. Viewing comparisons between international and
domestic constitutional law as a form of comparative constitutional law
misunderstands the relevant legal spheres and relationship(s) between them.

